REMOVED ITEMS ARE ALREADY TIMELINED CONTENT IS AT BOTTOM

207 But before commenting upon the actions of Generals Bates and Kobbe at the south we will present the operations in the Visayan military Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 207

208 district, commanded by Brigadier-General Hughes. This district embraced what is commonly known as the Visayas Islands, with head quarters at Iloilo, Panay. Our last annual report, rendered on August 31, showed that the city of Iloilo, with its outlying villages; the city of Cebu, on the island of that name, with the mountain country within a radius of. a few miles; and the important positions in the island of Negros, contained the only territory of the district within the possession of our troops. These troops consisted of Light Battery G, of the Sixth Artillery, the Eighteenth Infantry, and a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry, which were stationed in Panay; the Sixth Infantry garrisoned impor tant stations in Negros; one battalion of the Nineteenth and one of the Twenty-third held the city of Cebu. Two battalions of the Nineteenth Infantry had relieved the Tennessee regiment, of which two battalions had been stationed in Panay and one in Cebu. Colonel Snyder, who was commanding at the latter point, reported, early in September, the threatening attitude assumed there by the enemy, when General Hughes reenforced him by a detachment of Battery G, Sixth Artillery, and two companies of the Sixth Infantry. With his battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry, a portion of the Tennessee battalion still remain ing, the detachments sent him and a portion of the Twenty-third Infantry Battalion, he moved against the enemy (who now nearly encircled the city of Cebu) on September 22, and reported as a result of his operations, which extended through the following day, that he had driven the enemy oft', had captured 7 of his forts and 14 of his intrenched positions, with his cannon and a few small arms, suffering the loss of 1 man killed and 4 wounded; that the loss of the enemy, who had been scattered over the mountains to the south west ward, and whom it was impossible to follow because of lack of transportation, he estimated at 40 men. No further Cebu operations took place for some time, as additional troops and transportation were required to insure any decided and permanent success. On October 21 General Hughes was informed that the remaining battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and a large amount of transportation would leave Manila for Iloilo on October 24 and would be followed in a few days by an entire regiment of volunteers. The island of Negros, which had been made a subdistrict of the Visayan military district in March, to the command of which Brigadier- General Smith, then colonel of the California Volunteers, had been assigned, in which the California troops had been succeeded by the Sixth Infantry, and over which, in July, an abridged form of civil government (character and scope of same fully given in my last annual report) had been extended, was about to hold an election for the choice of a civil governor and advisory council. General Smith had made the necessary provisions for the registration of voters, the preparat ion of ballots, the met hod of casting votes, and had announced the time of the election for October 2. The inhabitants of Negros had taken very kindly to this feature of experimental abridged civil gov ernment, and the leading citizens had warmly expressed their sense of obligation to the American authorities for this manifested confidence in their ability to conduct in a measure theii internal civil affairs. On September 24 one of the leading insurgent chiefs, Gen. Ignacio Lopez, with 64 armed men, surrendered to Captain Byrne at Castellano, and the insurgents at Panay (not Tagalos) applied to know what promises would be given them in case of their formal submission. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 208

209 General Hughes informed the latter that they must surrender their arms and disband their forces before any terms could be considered or any promises made, but their action seemed to indicate a desire to receive the consideration which had been extended to Negros. How ever, this fortunate progress of affairs in that island was disquieting to the Tagalos, a few of whom resided there, while a large force of their soldiers, mostly from Luzon, dominated Panay. They, under the influence and general direction of Aguinaldo and of certain agents of the junta at Hongkong, who were sent from that place to foment discord, entered some of the coast towns of Negros, and especially its mountain sections, and were successful in collecting bolo men and moun tain robbers, to some of whom they furnished rifles, and with these bands were able to annoy our troops and plunder the inhabitants. They were pursued into the mountains and throughout the island, the native police force of 200 men which we had equipped performing most excellent service in the pursuit. On October 1 Captain Poore, with his company of the Sixth Infantry, attacked one of their intrenched camps, killed 20, including 2 noted robbers, captured 12 rifles, a large supply of ammunition, and all of their stores. His casualties were Lieutenant Grubbs, of the regiment, killed; Assistant Surgeon Shillock and 3 enlisted men very slightly wounded. On October 21 Lieutenant Simons, Sixth Infantry, struck a village of Tulisanes near San Carlos, killing and wounding 9. A few days later Captain Evans, of the same regiment, attacked a band near Castellano, killed 10,'wounded many, and captured 20. Captain Byrne, of that regiment, encountered another band, killed 10 and captured 13, while our native troops, who had discovered another small band destroyed 0. This, to them, sur prising and destructive activity, drove the Tagalos from the island, for a time at least, and on November 1 General Hughes reported that Negros was "in a better state of lawful submission than for twenty years; that planters were no longer in danger." The election created a good deal of enthusiasm, but passed off very quietly. Over 5,000 votes were polled, and no frauds attempted. The count was so close, however, that it was feared a contested election would result, but the inhabitants accepted the official count, and the inauguration of the newly elected officers was announced for Novem ber 6. It took place under the supervision of General Smith, and the newly installed civil governor sent the following cable dispateh through the office of the military governor at Manila: Negros, His Excellency the President of the United States: November 7, 1899. The civil governor, councilors, judges, and secretaries who constitute the new government of this island, in taking possession of their offices this day, have the high honor of affectionately saluting your excellency, and trust that in the inaugura tion of this form of government, ba.-ed upon the literal and democratic institutions which have made that great Republic so grand and prosperous, a new era will open up to this region, which will enable it to reach the ultimate goal of its aspirations. Melecio Severino. During the remainder of the month all reports from the island were of the most encouraging nature. The chief insurgent leader at the north voluntarily surrendered without asking conditions. The peo ple, assured of security, were apparently cheerful and hopeful, and recommenced in earnest their agricultural and other pursuits. More Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 209

210 planting was being done and more sugar mills were in operation than at any period since the inauguration of the revolt against Spain. The form of government which had been put in operation worked excel lently under the wise supervision of General Smith, who retained the confidence of all parties and factions. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 210

On November 20 he encountered the enemy strongly intrenched at the crossing of the Aganao River on the road from Leon to Almodian. After three hours maneuvering and fighting he drove him from all positions, suffering a loss of four men wounded. He immediately moved on to and seized Almodian and directed an attack by Carpenter's force on Pavia. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 211

At the same time Carpenter with his Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 211

Light Battery and two battalions of the Eighteenth Infantry attacked the insurgent stronghold at Pavia, 3 miles north of Jaro. The fighting continued until noon, with a loss to Carpenter of 5 men killed, 20 quite seriously wounded, who were, sent to the hospital at Iloilo, and some 15 others slightly wounded, but who remained with the command. The enemy's loss was very heavy in both men and material. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 212

Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 212

In Cebu, to which had been sent the second battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and part of the Forty-fourth Volunteers, the efforts of the enemy had received a severe check. On January 9 report was received from Iloilo that Colonel Snyder at Cebu had wired the com plete success on the previous day of certain operations conducted by detachments of the Nineteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, the Fortyfourth Volunteers, and a section of Light Battery G, Sixth Artillery, Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 215

216 against insurgents in Suction mountains, on main mountain chain northwestof Cebu. The enemy's entire position and many forts and intrenchments were taken and LI smoothbore cannon and 33 rifles were cap tured. Our casualties were 5 men wounded. Eight of the enemy's dead were found on the field. The insurgents were completely scat tered and native laborers destroyed all of their intrenchments. Three companies of the Forty-fourth Volunteers and one of the Nineteenth Infantry were dispatched on reeonnoissanees towards Toledo and Balamban in western Cebu. The troops captured successively the impor tant towns and cities on the east ot the island, meeting with consider able difficulty at the south of the city of Cebu, near the towns of EI Pardo and Talisay. They passed over the mountain trails to the west ward, in which they met with frequent opposition from small bands of insurgents, and garrisoned the principal points on the west coast. Our casualties were few, but the enemy, always worsted, suffered largely in men and property. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 216

On January 16 General Hughes sailed for the west coast of Panay with a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry commanded by Major Huston, two companies of the Sixth Infantry under Captain Walker, a battalion of selected men from the Forty -fourth Volunteers com manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, and Captain Gordon's scouts. He landed one of these battalions on the southwestern coast of the island, which marched northward across the jutting point of land which forms its extreme southern boundary, and proceeded with the remainder of his troops to San Jose de Buenavista, the capital and principal city of the province of Antique. He occupied the city and moved up the coast, inarching detachments to the main interior towns of the province, which met with only slight resistance from a few small bands, composed principally of Tagalos. The mass of the people deserted their places of abode and fled to the mountains. A native priest accounted for the fear exhibited on the part of the inhabitants by the fact that they knew nothing of the Americans except what had been told them by the Spanish clergy during or just preceding the Spanish war; that they were thoroughly impressed with the belief that all Americans were a cruel and godless lot and had come to rob and destroy them. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 216

The coast cities of Panay were opened to the coasting trade of the islands as rapidly as they were occupied by our troops. Until the capture of Capiz, on the northern boundary, the only outlet for outside trade was the city of Iloilo; then San Jose de Buena vista and Calivo followed. The merchants and inhabitants quickly availed themselves of trade privileges, and Panay is in about as flourishing a condition as during Spanish domination prior to the native revolt of 1896. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 218

Early in April General Hughes made a personal inspection of the eastern section of his district, over which General Kobbe had beeu exercising supervision, looking particularly into the affairs of Leyte and Samar, to the former of which he took from Cebu two com panies of the Twenty-third Infantry. The result of that inspection was submitted April 17 from lloilo, and appears on page 204 of this report. Therein he briefly sums up the conditions then existing in Panay and Cebu, remarking that the insurgent general, Fullon, of the province of Antique, Panay, had applied for permission to visit Iloilo and was then supposedly en route for that point; that one of the gen erals in Occidental Cebu had been killed a few days before, and that matters wore progressing slowly; that the commanding officer in that island had dismissed ''The Junta Insular and Municipal," formed before the advent of the army, and had taken charge of the govern ment, which would simplify matters very much, as the junta had given constant annoyance. This junta had been in charge of municipal affairs of the island during our entire occupation. It had not been disturbed for reasons given in my report of last year, wherein I remarked that: After the capture of lloilo the navy visited the city of Cebu and took quiet pos session of the place—the commanding officer of the force assuming direction of the business of captain of the port and collector of customs, and entering into an arrange ment with the more prominent citizens to permit them to conduct their own internal affaire. * * * The battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry which was sent to Cebu Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 218

219 the latter part of February had not taken any action in civil matters but had pre served order in the community. The citizens had looked after their own local inter ests, and officers of the navy "had continued to conduct harbor and customs affairs, from which they, were now relieved by army officers detailed to perform the duties of thoi*e positions. Shortly thereafter the dissensions between the well-disposed and hostile-intentioned natives became bitter and culminated in the assassination of one of the most prominent citizens simply because he advocated United States protec tion, and attempts were made upon the lives of others who favored United States occupation. This junta proved to be nothing more nor less than an insurgent " body which failed to give any protection whatever to friendly -disposed inhabitants. In fact, the ablest man of that section of country. Judge Llorente, a present member of the supreme court of the Philippines, has been unable to visit his home in Cebu without placing life in jeop ardy. It therefore became an absolute necessity to overthrow this so-called civil establishment, and any future government of a civil char acter must await a manifested, more pacific disposition on the part of many of the influential natives. The topography of all the Visayan Islands is very advantageous for defense. In all, the greater proportion of the territory is rough and mountainous. The people who inhabit the mountain country are densely ignorant, superstitious, easily influenced by the abler natives, and many of them still hold to their ancient gods and heathen cere monies. This class has always robbed its lowland neighbors, and from it the insurgent Tagalos have drawn their principal assistance, espe cially the bolo contingent, which has in many instances been induced to viciously attack our troops, and has in consequence suffered severely. To reduce this class of people to submission or to entirely check its forays on the coast towns—an occupation acquired from or existing in heredity—must necessarily be a labor of time; but our troops, unlike those which were maintained by Spain, pursue them to their moun tain concealments, and inflict punishments they neither anticipate nor think possible. In the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu over fifty military stations are maintained; consequently the majority of the inhabitants are comparatively secure, and are gradually gaining confi dence, so much so that in many instances they have given us assistance without fearing the vengeance of their adversaries, which would surely visit them were our protection withdrawn. Prior to reporting the operations on the north Mindanao coast of the troops sent there from Manila on March 20, under the command of Major-General Bates, a brief review of our military experience within the district of Mindanao and Jolo should be presented. At the date of our last annual report the only troops stationed within the dis trict were the two battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry, of which six companies were stationed at the port of Jolo, one at Siassi, and one at Bongao on the Taui Taui group of islands. The Moros of the Jolo Archipelago, through their datos, professed friendship which their actions indicated. The Sultan, however, continued to keep some what aloof, pressing his money claim for the maintenance at our expense of the police force at Siassi, which he had established before American occupation. He was distinctly informed by General Bates that the claim could not be favorably considered, and he refused to accept the monthly compensation allowed him for services, a compen sation which Spain had paid and which we concluded to continue. Report of Maj. Gen. E.S. Otis, May 15, 1899 From September 1, 1899 to May 5, 1900 Page 219

ANNUAL REPORT OF GENERAL OTIS, MAY 14, 1900 FROM SEPTEMBER 1, 1899 TO MAY 5, 1900 This page contains the visayan district only, but the pdf has the full report.

VISAYAN MILITARY DISTRICT

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207 But before commenting upon the actions of Generals Bates and Kobbe at the south we will present the operations in the Visayan military

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208 district, commanded by Brigadier-General Hughes. This district embraced what is commonly known as the Visayas Islands, with head quarters at Iloilo, Panay. Our last annual report, rendered on August 31, showed that the city of Iloilo, with its outlying villages; the city of Cebu, on the island of that name, with the mountain country within a radius of. a few miles; and the important positions in the island of Negros, contained the only territory of the district within the possession of our troops. These troops consisted of Light Battery G, of the Sixth Artillery, the Eighteenth Infantry, and a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry, which were stationed in Panay; the Sixth Infantry garrisoned impor tant stations in Negros; one battalion of the Nineteenth and one of the Twenty-third held the city of Cebu. Two battalions of the Nineteenth Infantry had relieved the Tennessee regiment, of which two battalions had been stationed in Panay and one in Cebu. Colonel Snyder, who was commanding at the latter point, reported, early in September, the threatening attitude assumed there by the enemy, when General Hughes reenforced him by a detachment of Battery G, Sixth Artillery, and two companies of the Sixth Infantry. With his battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry, a portion of the Tennessee battalion still remain ing, the detachments sent him and a portion of the Twenty-third Infantry Battalion, he moved against the enemy (who now nearly encircled the city of Cebu) on September 22, and reported as a result of his operations, which extended through the following day, that he had driven the enemy oft', had captured 7 of his forts and 14 of his intrenched positions, with his cannon and a few small arms, suffering the loss of 1 man killed and 4 wounded; that the loss of the enemy, who had been scattered over the mountains to the south west ward, and whom it was impossible to follow because of lack of transportation, he estimated at 40 men. No further Cebu operations took place for some time, as additional troops and transportation were required to insure any decided and permanent success. On October 21 General Hughes was informed that the remaining battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and a large amount of transportation would leave Manila for Iloilo on October 24 and would be followed in a few days by an entire regiment of volunteers. The island of Negros, which had been made a subdistrict of the Visayan military district in March, to the command of which Brigadier- General Smith, then colonel of the California Volunteers, had been assigned, in which the California troops had been succeeded by the Sixth Infantry, and over which, in July, an abridged form of civil government (character and scope of same fully given in my last annual report) had been extended, was about to hold an election for the choice of a civil governor and advisory council. General Smith had made the necessary provisions for the registration of voters, the preparat ion of ballots, the met hod of casting votes, and had announced the time of the election for October 2. The inhabitants of Negros had taken very kindly to this feature of experimental abridged civil gov ernment, and the leading citizens had warmly expressed their sense of obligation to the American authorities for this manifested confidence in their ability to conduct in a measure theii internal civil affairs. On September 24 one of the leading insurgent chiefs, Gen. Ignacio Lopez, with 64 armed men, surrendered to Captain Byrne at Castellano, and the insurgents at Panay (not Tagalos) applied to know what promises would be given them in case of their formal submission.

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209 General Hughes informed the latter that they must surrender their arms and disband their forces before any terms could be considered or any promises made, but their action seemed to indicate a desire to receive the consideration which had been extended to Negros. How ever, this fortunate progress of affairs in that island was disquieting to the Tagalos, a few of whom resided there, while a large force of their soldiers, mostly from Luzon, dominated Panay. They, under the influence and general direction of Aguinaldo and of certain agents of the junta at Hongkong, who were sent from that place to foment discord, entered some of the coast towns of Negros, and especially its mountain sections, and were successful in collecting bolo men and moun tain robbers, to some of whom they furnished rifles, and with these bands were able to annoy our troops and plunder the inhabitants. They were pursued into the mountains and throughout the island, the native police force of 200 men which we had equipped performing most excellent service in the pursuit. On October 1 Captain Poore, with his company of the Sixth Infantry, attacked one of their intrenched camps, killed 20, including 2 noted robbers, captured 12 rifles, a large supply of ammunition, and all of their stores. His casualties were Lieutenant Grubbs, of the regiment, killed; Assistant Surgeon Shillock and 3 enlisted men very slightly wounded. On October 21 Lieutenant Simons, Sixth Infantry, struck a village of Tulisanes near San Carlos, killing and wounding 9. A few days later Captain Evans, of the same regiment, attacked a band near Castellano, killed 10,'wounded many, and captured 20. Captain Byrne, of that regiment, encountered another band, killed 10 and captured 13, while our native troops, who had discovered another small band destroyed 0. This, to them, sur prising and destructive activity, drove the Tagalos from the island, for a time at least, and on November 1 General Hughes reported that Negros was "in a better state of lawful submission than for twenty years; that planters were no longer in danger." The election created a good deal of enthusiasm, but passed off very quietly. Over 5,000 votes were polled, and no frauds attempted. The count was so close, however, that it was feared a contested election would result, but the inhabitants accepted the official count, and the inauguration of the newly elected officers was announced for Novem ber 6. It took place under the supervision of General Smith, and the newly installed civil governor sent the following cable dispateh through the office of the military governor at Manila: Negros, His Excellency the President of the United States: November 7, 1899. The civil governor, councilors, judges, and secretaries who constitute the new government of this island, in taking possession of their offices this day, have the high honor of affectionately saluting your excellency, and trust that in the inaugura tion of this form of government, ba.-ed upon the literal and democratic institutions which have made that great Republic so grand and prosperous, a new era will open up to this region, which will enable it to reach the ultimate goal of its aspirations. Melecio Severino. During the remainder of the month all reports from the island were of the most encouraging nature. The chief insurgent leader at the north voluntarily surrendered without asking conditions. The peo ple, assured of security, were apparently cheerful and hopeful, and recommenced in earnest their agricultural and other pursuits. More

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210 planting was being done and more sugar mills were in operation than at any period since the inauguration of the revolt against Spain. The form of government which had been put in operation worked excel lently under the wise supervision of General Smith, who retained the confidence of all parties and factions. The Third Battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and the Twentysixth U. S. Volunteers were sent to lloilo during the last week of October. They had been preceded by a fair amount of quartermas ter's transportation and a few small guns from which, together with those already there, a mountain battery might be organized. General Hughes commenced at once his preparations to move against the Panay insurgents. They had constructed intrenched lines of defense within short distances of the city on all roads radiating from it which they had thrown up in part in 1898 while fighting the Spanish troops, and which, with the labor expended upon them since that time, they believed to be unassailable. The insurgent encircling force was esti mated at from two to three thousand, mostly Tagalos, the great majority of whom had been sent into the island to assist the Visayans to drive out Spain and to resist the forcible entry into the city of General Miller with his United States troops, which entry was threatened from December 28, 1898, when General Miller took pos session of lloilo Harbor, until it was finally consummated on the 11th of February following. The Tagalos and Visayans have never held any very long continued amicable relations. Birth prejudice, attempted Tagalo direction, and the desire of many influential Visayans to follow the lead of Negroshad destroyed all mutual confidence, if any had ever existed, and as a result the Tagalos had appropriated nearly all the guns in the island and held the Visayans in restraint. Their differences were reported to be quite serious, and at one time it was believed that if not inter fered with, they, after the manner pursued by the factions of southern Mindanao, would fight out the war in that section among themselves. Examining the topography of Panay it will lie seen that the four provinces into which it is divided have boundaries determined natu rally by mountain ranges and high watersheds. The central provinces of lloilo to the south and Capiz to the north are separated from Antique on the west by an almost inaccessible mountain range, and from the small province of Concepcion on the cast coast by a range of high land from which the rivers flow northward and eastward. They are separated from each other by the elevated divide extending from the mountains which mark the eastern limit of the province of Antique to the western line of Concepcion province. The town of Capiz, on the extreme north of the island, is connected with the city of lloilo by a rough wagon road, along which runs the old telegraph line which connected the former cable termini at Capiz and lloilo. A few insurgent troops were maintained at Capiz. but the great majority of them were concentrated in the southern section of lloilo province, south of the town of Cabatuan, where the insurgent capital had been established. General Miller on February 12, 1899, a few days after occupying the city of lloilo. had seized the near villages of Molo and Jaro, and had subsequently reconnoitered the country to Oton, on the coast, and to the north and northwest in the direction of Pavia and San Miguel. In whatever direction he prospected he found a fair force of the enemy to oppose his advance. The instructions

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211 given to General Hughes in .June, when he left Manila to take com mand of the Visayan district, were to limit all his operations in Panay to the secure holding of the city of Iloilo and such of its outlying vil lages as were then in our possession, "as no additional force could be given him, and as the policy of nonaction in the island other than such as might be considered defensive would result in dissensions between the Visayan and Tagalo, who should we attack would unite for resistance." The policy of waiting, in so far as active war oper ations were concerned, was resorted to at Iloilo, the insurgents being made to confine themselves to their intrenehments until the October reenforcements of 1,700 men were sent there. Upon the arrival of these reenforcements one of the most severe typhoons that had ever visited that section of country set in and prevailed for several days, but General Hughes commenced his advance on November 9. The plan of operations determined upon was to turn the right of the enemy by marching a column consisting of two battalions of the Nine teenth Infantry, a battalion of the Eighteenth, the mountain battery, and a mounted detachment over the south coast road to Oton, thence north to San Miguel and Almodian, swinging in on Cabatuan, when Lieutenant-Colonel Dickman, with a portion of the Twenty -sixth Vol unteers, assisted by men of the Sixth Infantry withdrawn from Negros, should attack at Jaro, and Colonel Carpenter, with Light Battery G, Sixth Artillery, and two battalions of the Eighteenth Infantry, should attack Pavia and Santa Barbara. The excessive rain compelled a modification of the plans. General Hughes, commanding the march ing column, reached Oton on November 10, from which he reported as follows: Water-logged by typhoon. Have modified plans. Bottom fallen out of San Miguel road. Tigbauan was occupied to-day. Fine defensive works every where, but defenders disappeared without tiring a shot. Fear much delay owing to stormy weather. On November 12 he reported the following from Tigbauan: Cordoba occupied by Huston's battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry, mounted detachment, and mountain battery. No resistance offered. The balance of the force has been assembled here. Rain has been exceedingly heavy. There is a bottom to the road from here to Cabatuan so far as examined. We have had to build one bridge, but will delay a little for stream to run out. Command in excellent spirits and nealth. He further reported from Tigbauan the following day that the advance had entered Leon where the enemy had offered the first resist ance and had been driven out with loss, but that he had not suffered any casualties. On November 20 he encountered the enemy strongly intrenched at the crossing of the Aganao River on the road from Leon to Almodian. After three hours maneuvering and fighting he drove him from all positions, suffering a loss of four men wounded. He immediately moved on to and seized Almodian and directed an attack by Carpenter's force on Pavia. At dawn on November 21 Colonel Dickman with his force, consist ing of six companies of the Twenty-sixth Volunteers and one of the Sixth Infantry, attacked near Jaro, captured the strong position of the enemy by a charge on the flank of his works and completely routed him with a loss of 18 killed, 9 prisoners, 4 one-pounder brass field pieces, 2 rifles, and several thousand cartridges. Colonel Dickman's casualties were 6 men wounded. At the same time Carpenter with his

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212 Light Battery and two battalions of the Eighteenth Infantry attacked the insurgent stronghold at Pavia, 3 miles north of Jaro. The fighting continued until noon, with a loss to Carpenter of 5 men killed, 20 quite seriously wounded, who were, sent to the hospital at Iloilo, and some 15 others slightly wounded, but who remained with the command. The enemy's loss was very heavy in both men and material. On the morning of the 22d Carpenter advanced to Santa Barbara, which he occupied without resistance. From Cabatuan on November 23, General Hughes reported the results of these operations as follows: The enemy has been driven out from Pavia, Santa Barbara, San Miguel, Oton, Tigbauan, Cordoba, Leon, Almodian, Maasin, and Cabatuan, the seat of government, and the boasted army headquarters have taken to the mountains. There were but two actions, the first on the 20th at the crossing of the Aganao, and when the result of that action was certain, and the enemy had shown his full strength on that front, it was evident that it would be entirely safe for Colonel Carpenter to attack at Pavia, and he was ordered by signal to do so. He attacked the advance of the enemy on the south of the Aganao at daylight and drove them into Pavia. He then attacked the defenses of Pavia and took the place. These actions compelled the abandonment of Santa Barbara, Maasin, and Cabatuan. * * * Captured 10 prisoners, 18 cannon of all kinds, (i rifles, quantities of ammunition, powder, etc. These victories appeared to have greatly scattered, if they did not destroy, for a short time at least, all of the insurgent armed organiza tions. Three or four days thereafter General Hughes, continuing his march northward, entered Passi, in the northern portion of Iloilo province. Carpenter in the meantime moving eastward into the prov ince of Concepcion without encountering any material opposition. On December 3 the General cabled from Iloilo. to which place he had returned, that he hoped to be able to send very soon into Cebu the mountain battery, the detachment of scouts, and the two battalions of the Nineteenth Infantry, and at the same time to dispatch for the island of Bohol two or three companies of the Sixth Infantry. He returned to middle Panay, prospected with his troops in that section, marched north, occupied the town of Capiz, and, assisted by a naval force, proceeded thence with two companies Eighteenth Infantry to the island of Romblon, from which he reported the following: Romblon, December 16, 1899. Barry, Manila: Crossed Panay Mountains as proposed. Slight, opposition on debouching at Dumaro, which was brushed away by Gordon's scouts and Shank's battalion Eight eenth Infantry. Othertowns Capiz province received us with bands of music instead of Mausers. At same time Carpenter cleared provincof Concepcion. Having assist ance of steamer El Cano and Captain Ackley's naval vessels, he followed coast, scattered the insurgents, and arrived off Capiz the 12th instant. 1 occupied Capiz with my command on the 10th. Dianno and his Tagalos reported to have escaped by steamers by this route. Documents indicate thatthis place is centerof insurgents' postal service," and therefore has teen taken possession of to-day by two companies Eighteenth Infantry. We were assisted in operations against Romblon by Captain Ackleywith the Concord and the gunboat I'aragua, Captain McFarland making land attack with two companies. The whole matter was settled in half an hour. Our casualties: Private Charles J. Feeley, Company C, Eighteenth Infantry, killed; one seaman on Parai/uu wounded. Expect to go to Cebu to-night via Capiz, taking up First Battalion Nineteenth Infantry at that place. Will leave Carpenter in command at Capiz with six companies "of his regiment. Hughes. The small island of Romblon, north of Panay. from which thisrepoi-t was rendered, is situated on what was then the water route of insur gent communication between Luzon and the western Visayau Islands,

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213 and became of groat importance to the Tagalos of Luzon, both in dis patching troops for the south and as a point from which to distribute information and issue instructions. From Romblon, Panay was very easy of access, and from Panay correspondence could be conveyed across Negros and Cebu to Bohol with little difficulty. With thislatter island, northern Midanao, Samar, and Leyte had frequent communi cation. The garrison of two companies still remains at Romblon, and nearly all coasting vessels plying the southern Philippine waters touch and report there. While General Hughes was absent in the north, Negros again experienced social and political difficulties. On December 18, General Smith cabled from Bacolod, the capital of the island, that— Three agents, Junta Hongkong, Candido Mortillo, Pedro Yunki, Mariano Villaneuva, arrived in Negros latter part of November with orders to stir up Negros, as its attitude was stumbling block to peace and aspirations of insurgents. They brought with them copies of Blumentritt's letter and word that absolute independence would be granted by Congress in December or January, and then let Negros beware. Planned general rising all pueblos for 2d December, and arrangements made with Panay to land force between Himamaylan and Pulupandan from Guimaras, and between Saravia and Manapla from Tenurian gunboats. Unable to prevent force of 86 from landing south of Miranda. Most of those in north were really driven out of Panay by General Hughes's advance, and nothing has been heard of them. Agents succeeded in getting Millicianos of Valladolid, Pulupandan, and Bago into field as part of general projected rising, and with 63 rifles and 320 Macheteros encountered Ledyard'B scouting party, receiving such severe handling that they retreated to moun tains, leaving 16 dead, and 1 of their chiefs on the field. The American corporal, after death of Led yard, retired to Carlota without molestation. Many of Millicianos who were in this fight have deserted, some surrendering their arms, claiming to have been deceived; others in hiding. The 86 Tagals retreating for Guimaras assaulted, with connivance of people, 11 Americans in Ginigaran, but were defeated and chief captured. Town fined $10,000. All officials and principal citizens arrested. Val ladolid, Pulupandan, and Bago also fined. Governor gone north, ostensibly to coun sel peace. Believed he is in good faith; but am watching, although he "has given good information. Two padres concerned in this trouble. What shall I do with them? American clergymen wanted here badly. Colonel Byrne in pursuit of Gui maras outfit. Tagals in north supposed to be in neighborhood of Manzanares, in mountains, with about 300 macheteros. In this island are some 2,000 Babaylanes and outlaws, largely bequeathed bv Spain, but increased by present conditions. " They have not as yet arrived at the bad dignity of insurgents. This influence from Panay necessitates 3 companies additional herein, inasmuch as Negros is now the objective of the Junta, and we have not only the duty of looking out for ourselves, but also of protecting our adherents in the pueblos. The danger here is from the ignorant people, who, of course, are in the majority, and are easily imposed upon by most improbable statements of designing persons. Our friends are naturally timid, and only come valiantly to our side when the storm has passed. Elections went off peaceably and quietly, every pueblo in existence in the island taking part, and full of enthusiasm. Only trouble that developed was close vote for governor, and that was left to judges and council to' settle. The government is working earnestly and energetically without friction. All would be serene here if there was no outside interference, no landings of the dreaded Tagals, and no fear that Aguinaldo may come into power and punish Negros for what it has done. When the influential man fears these things, he ceases to be our earnest advocate, and the ignorant design ing obtain the mastery until some deed of our arms gives confidence again. Bago, • Pulupandan, and Bacolod have protested against present trouble, and civil govern ment and meeting of prominent men request that all good citizens join in bringing about tranquillity. General Smith was promptly informed that he could have all the troops for Negros he wanted, and was asked how large an additional force he required. A battalion of the Forty-fourth Volunteers, which had just arrived in Manila harbor, was directed to proceed to Negros, and it was intended to send to the Visayan district the headquarters

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214 and two remaining battalions of the same as soon as points at which they were most needed could be determined. In the meantime Gen eral Hughes had returned to his headquarters at lloilo, whence, on December 20, he cabled the following: Situation in Panay: No organized enemy now known to be in the provinces of lloilo, Concepcion, or Capiz. Possibly a force may still be in Valley Aeklan, as I could not reach it by either road or trail from Capiz, and during this monsoon coast landings impracticable. It will have to be reached from west coast. Antique prov ince has not yet teen touched, but plans have been made for doing so. The business of the island has improved, and but two or three complaints of robbers have so far been received. Situation in Negros: Some insurgents did doubtless endeavor to escape from Panay to central and northern Negros, but I was in Dumaguete yester day, and eastern and southern Negros are reported to be absolutely at rest, and every body attending to business. The business men now here from Negros are busy about their affairs and do not fear serious trouble. Experience has taught me to discount heavily telegrams from Bacolod, but I shall look into the matter very care fully. In Cebu the troops have done nothing since the raid of the Tennessee Vol unteers. There are now 14 companies and 2 field and 2 mountain guns on that, island. When I reached there on the 18th the estimated strength of the insurgents was 150 rifles. During the evening a report came in stating that 250 rifles and 3,500 rounds of ammunition had been landed at Sogod from Leyte. The enemy are located on the mountain ridges and reaching them is too difficult, * * * So far as I can learn in the few hours I have been back everything has gone as anticipated and there are no reasons for anxiety. Hale's battalion being ordered directly to Negros, do the others of the Forty-fourth come to the district? The General was informed on December 23 that Major Hale's bat talion of the Forty-fourth had sailed from Manila for Negros that morning, and that headquarters and the remaining battalions would sail by transport Hancock for lloilo on the evening of the 25th. He was also informed that no movement on either Samar or Leyte had yet been inaugurated, but would be made in conjunction with his troops if he might nave any to spare for that purpose—he sending them to the western and southern coast of Leyte. He was requested to report as soon as practicable what dispositions he could make to carry out this suggestion, and at the same time to keep all country already covered by his troops efficiently policed. On the 25th he reported that the insurgents had attacked Captain Brownwell's company of the Twentysixth Volunteers the 22d instant at the town of Sara, Concepcion province, had been repulsed with heavy loss in men, aud 20 rifles had been taken from them; also that the insurgents of Romblon were reporting and surrendering their arms to Captain McFarland. At the time of the attack on Sara the General was about to rearrange the locations of his troops, intending to station the entire Eighteenth Infantry in the country north of the southern line of the province of Capiz, the Twenty -sixth Volunteers in the southern and central por tions of lloilo province, and the entire Sixth Infantry in Negros. A battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry, intended for Cebu, with the mounted detachment, a portion of the mountain battery, and the mule train, was then en route for lloilo from Capiz by the Mambusao and Tapaz trail. The Forty fourth Infantry upon arrival able for the islands of Bohol and Leyte. The insurgentmsiwghhot batetaavcakiel-d' the town of Sara were evidently Tagalos, who had partially reunited after they were driven into northern Panay. Some of them had escaped to their homes by the Romblon route, but the majority had retreated to the mountains of the northwestern and western portions of the island, through which our troops soon after pursued them with varying success.

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215 Friction between the Negros people of divergent opinions again caused excitement and gave the troops renewed activity. General Hughes on January 13 repeated a dispatch he had received from Lieutenant-Colonel Byrne, of the Fortieth Infantry, which stated briefly the origin of some of the difficulty. The repeated dispatch is as follows: Iloilo, January IS, 1000. Barry, Manila: Following was received, sent me from Negros in reply to request for facts: "Angel Araneta arrived La Carlota shortly before the breaking out of revolution there. His arrival was regarded as a sign of trouble and caused uneasiness. I had previously heard of him as a promoter of revolutions in Iloilo, although very adroitly professing friendship for Americans, as all revolutionists do. I had him watched, and found he made visits to the coast shortly before the revolution broke out there. I was also informed, on good authority, that at a dinner he said that anyone who befriended the Americans would lie assassinated when the Filipinos came in power. I was also informed that he was accumulating arms at his hacienda. Thinking it time, in view of the serious condition of affairs, to act, and knowing his general repu tation to be very bad as a revolutionist, I searched his house, and found 2 rifles, 3 revolvers, 2 shotguns, 300 rounds of ammunition, and other weapons. Have kept him in confinement to help keep peace in this vicinity. Byrne." Hughes. On January 16, the day General Hughes departed for the western Panay coast, his adjutant-general at Iloilo telegraphed a report he had received that morning from General Smith. It reads: Iloilo, January 16, 1900. Barry, Manila: General Smith transmits report from Lieutenant-Colonel Byrne that Zoilo Mauricio, Tagalo from Panay, who landed at Ginigaran with 86 rifles and took part in the attack on that place December 7, asked for conference on 13th, which was granted. Zoilo appeared at conference with 30 Tagalos well armed and uniformed. Stated he had been invited by some leading people of Negros to land and take command of revolutionary forces; that he was much disappointed with outlook; did not want to fight Americans; wanted safe place in which to reside until autonomy was granted in Luzon, when he would surrender. Pending this he proposed a truce, Filipino officers to be permitted to wear uniforms and side arms in pueblos. Colonel Byrne replied that there could be no such understanding; that Tagalos were acting the past of bandits and outlaws, and that no conditions would be considered except uncondi tional surrender; that if they choose to return to the mountains they would be hunted down and destroyed as long as one of them was in arms against the Government. Zoilo refused these terms and returned to the mountains. Byrne obtained full infor mation of location of enemy and (as I understand from message) that same night returned Zoilo's call with 70 men, attacking at dawn next day. Byrne and Nesbit, with advance party of 20 men, surprised headcraarters and routed enemy completely. Nineteen of Zoilo's Tagalos were killed, 28 Mauser, Remington, ami Murratta rifles in perfect condition, and 19 belts containing 1,400 roundsof ammunition were captured. One insurgent officer killed; reported, but not confirmed, that it was Mauricio him self. Night march was very trying and severe. Necessitated climbing almost per pendicular side of mountains. No casualties on our side. Mann. This prompt action brought to a speedy termination +he threatened Tagalo activity and reproduced the accustomed quiet in Negros. In Cebu, to which had been sent the second battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and part of the Forty-fourth Volunteers, the efforts of the enemy had received a severe check. On January 9 report was received from Iloilo that Colonel Snyder at Cebu had wired the com plete success on the previous day of certain operations conducted by detachments of the Nineteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, the Fortyfourth Volunteers, and a section of Light Battery G, Sixth Artillery,

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216 against insurgents in Suction mountains, on main mountain chain northwestof Cebu. The enemy's entire position and many forts and intrenchments were taken and LI smoothbore cannon and 33 rifles were cap tured. Our casualties were 5 men wounded. Eight of the enemy's dead were found on the field. The insurgents were completely scat tered and native laborers destroyed all of their intrenchments. Three companies of the Forty-fourth Volunteers and one of the Nineteenth Infantry were dispatched on reeonnoissanees towards Toledo and Balamban in western Cebu. The troops captured successively the impor tant towns and cities on the east ot the island, meeting with consider able difficulty at the south of the city of Cebu, near the towns of EI Pardo and Talisay. They passed over the mountain trails to the west ward, in which they met with frequent opposition from small bands of insurgents, and garrisoned the principal points on the west coast. Our casualties were few, but the enemy, always worsted, suffered largely in men and property. On January 16 General Hughes sailed for the west coast of Panay with a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry commanded by Major Huston, two companies of the Sixth Infantry under Captain Walker, a battalion of selected men from the Forty -fourth Volunteers com manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, and Captain Gordon's scouts. He landed one of these battalions on the southwestern coast of the island, which marched northward across the jutting point of land which forms its extreme southern boundary, and proceeded with the remainder of his troops to San Jose de Buenavista, the capital and principal city of the province of Antique. He occupied the city and moved up the coast, inarching detachments to the main interior towns of the province, which met with only slight resistance from a few small bands, composed principally of Tagalos. The mass of the people deserted their places of abode and fled to the mountains. A native priest accounted for the fear exhibited on the part of the inhabitants by the fact that they knew nothing of the Americans except what had been told them by the Spanish clergy during or just preceding the Spanish war; that they were thoroughly impressed with the belief that all Americans were a cruel and godless lot and had come to rob and destroy them. The Tagalos had looked upon this coast as a place of comparative safety for the landing of troops and the concealment of their boats. A schooner of considerable size, which had received a part of its armament, was captured in one of the rivers quite a dis tance from its mouth, and a small amount of war material was obtained. Leaving Major Huston, with his battalion of the Nineteenth Infan try, to look after the affairs of the province. General Hughes sent two companies of the Sixth Infantry and Captain Gordon's scouts to the northern coast of the island by the route from Pandan to Ibaiay, and directed the battalion of the Fourty-fourth Infantry to march across the mountains into the upper Aclan Valley, thence to proceed over the rough trail to the north in the direction of Calivo. He reported this movement from his headquarters at Iloilo, to which point he had returned, in the following cablegram: Iloilo, February 3, 1900. Barry, Manila: Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, with 200 picked men Fourty-fourth, crossed mountains from Paringayan into upper Aclan \ alley. Gordon's scouts and Captain Walker, Sixth, crossed" Pass Pandan to Ibajay; objective of both, Calivo. Three or four hun

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217 dred Tagalos fled from Calivo on appearance Gordon's scouts January 30. Were pursued up the Actao the 31st by Walker and Gordon. Finding Scott on their line of retreat, they scattered in mountains. A small force attempted to oppose Scott, fording river at Madalag, but were brushed away. Our only casualty Noah L. Short, H, Forty-fourth, wounded right thigh. Left Walker with two companies Sixth in Calivo. Returned here with rest of command. Hughes. Three days thereafter the following message was received from Iloilo: February 6, 1900. General Otis, Manila: Schwan telegraphed December 23 asking cooperation on west coast of Leyte. Answered would endeavor to do so after Aclan Valley expedition, with one or two battalions. Keep faith by offering one, but confess I would rather not send it until some disturbances threatened in Panay are quieted. Hughes. The insurgents evidently had reunited in small bands and returned from the mountain country, determined to annoy our troops by sur prise and ambush, if not destroy them in part, scattered as our com panies now were among the more important towns of the island. • They drew their subsistence, of course, from the inhabitants, whom they com pelled to contribute of their scant food and also of their money and treasures. Secure concealment by the people of their personal prop erty alone made it safe, and by furnishing information to our officers they would, if detected by the robbers, forfeit their lives. These bands committed their depredations not only in northern and central Panay, but visited the southern portions of Iloilo province. They, however, gradually tired or became dissatisfied with their occupation, as it was attended with great risk and little recompense, for our men were active, were more than a match for them at brush tactics, and caught them continually cither at a disadvantage or under circumstances where their superior marksmanship and intelligence were abundantly rewarded. About the middle of February 107 Tagalos, with 100 rifles, surren dered to the commanding officer of the troops at Capiz, and were sent at Government expense to the town of Taal, on the southern Luzon coast, from which place they were permitted to go to their homes in different sections of that island. Occasionally an insurgent band scored a slight success, one of which, and one quite unfortunate for our troops, occurred on February 28, which was reported by Lieutenant McBroom, of the Eighteenth Infantry, commanding a company of that regiment at Mambusao, Capiz province. His report was as follows: Sent detachment under sergeant to gain information of roads from Jamindan to Aclan Valley, and trail from Jamindan to Jimeno. He arrived at Jamindan without accident oranything suspicious occurring, the natives saying there were no insurgents in mountains. Yesterday party was started to Mambusao to report, while main body was to attempt to go to Jimeno. Insurgents opened fire on party sent back; the others went to the scene; firing lasted two hours. Our men held Jamindan, and to-day fought their way back to Mambusao. Report insurgents in considerable force intrenched in hills between Jagnaya and Jamindan. Four men missing from party sent back—all Company I, Eighteenth Infantry: Israel Cook, George M. Williams, Walter H. Cowern, and Maurice Driscoll; not known whether killed or captured. No other casualties. The above is an exceptional case, as in the great majority of these minor affairs our troops suffered no losses. A few days previous Lieutenant-Colonel Dickman surrounded and captured at Dingle, in the Tloilo province, without casualty, a band of 46 insurgents, and later, in the month of March, Lieutenant Brooks, of the Eighteenth Infantry,

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218 struck a band near Pontevcdra and Pilar, on the northern Panay coast, which left 14 dead and 5 wounded on the field of battle, together with 19 rifles. His loss was 1 man killed and 2 wounded. This character of warfare will doubtless continue for some time. The Spaniards never held central Panay in subjection. It has always been at the mercy of ladrone bands, and the experience which they are now receiv ing is their first severe lesson in imposed individual restraint. The coast cities of Panay were opened to the coasting trade of the islands as rapidly as they were occupied by our troops. Until the capture of Capiz, on the northern boundary, the only outlet for outside trade was the city of Iloilo; then San Jose de Buena vista and Calivo followed. The merchants and inhabitants quickly availed themselves of trade privileges, and Panay is in about as flourishing a condition as during Spanish domination prior to the native revolt of 1896. By the middle of March the progress made in Panay, Negros, and Cebu enabled General Hughes to look after affairs in the more eastern islands of his district. Major Hale, of the Forty-fourth Infantry, landed in Bohol on March 17 without opposition. He was hospitably received by the inhabitants, who had suffered greatly from the depre dations of the Cebu, Leyte, and northern Mindanao insurgents. Major Hale quickly distributed his troops throughout the island, and by his judicious and conservative action in protecting the rights of the people and in opening up the former avenues of trade won their confidence to such a degree that he or any of his men were able to journey through the island in comparative personal security without guard or escort. While awaiting the time when the United States could take active possession of the island the inhabitants had established a crude form of government. This peaceably gave way to United States military control, which the people desired and for which on several occasions they had importuned. Early in April General Hughes made a personal inspection of the eastern section of his district, over which General Kobbe had beeu exercising supervision, looking particularly into the affairs of Leyte and Samar, to the former of which he took from Cebu two com panies of the Twenty-third Infantry. The result of that inspection was submitted April 17 from lloilo, and appears on page 204 of this report. Therein he briefly sums up the conditions then existing in Panay and Cebu, remarking that the insurgent general, Fullon, of the province of Antique, Panay, had applied for permission to visit Iloilo and was then supposedly en route for that point; that one of the gen erals in Occidental Cebu had been killed a few days before, and that matters wore progressing slowly; that the commanding officer in that island had dismissed ''The Junta Insular and Municipal," formed before the advent of the army, and had taken charge of the govern ment, which would simplify matters very much, as the junta had given constant annoyance. This junta had been in charge of municipal affairs of the island during our entire occupation. It had not been disturbed for reasons given in my report of last year, wherein I remarked that: After the capture of lloilo the navy visited the city of Cebu and took quiet pos session of the place—the commanding officer of the force assuming direction of the business of captain of the port and collector of customs, and entering into an arrange ment with the more prominent citizens to permit them to conduct their own internal affaire. * * * The battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry which was sent to Cebu

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219 the latter part of February had not taken any action in civil matters but had pre served order in the community. The citizens had looked after their own local inter ests, and officers of the navy "had continued to conduct harbor and customs affairs, from which they, were now relieved by army officers detailed to perform the duties of thoi*e positions. Shortly thereafter the dissensions between the well-disposed and hostile-intentioned natives became bitter and culminated in the assassination of one of the most prominent citizens simply because he advocated United States protec tion, and attempts were made upon the lives of others who favored United States occupation. This junta proved to be nothing more nor less than an insurgent " body which failed to give any protection whatever to friendly -disposed inhabitants. In fact, the ablest man of that section of country. Judge Llorente, a present member of the supreme court of the Philippines, has been unable to visit his home in Cebu without placing life in jeop ardy. It therefore became an absolute necessity to overthrow this so-called civil establishment, and any future government of a civil char acter must await a manifested, more pacific disposition on the part of many of the influential natives. The topography of all the Visayan Islands is very advantageous for defense. In all, the greater proportion of the territory is rough and mountainous. The people who inhabit the mountain country are densely ignorant, superstitious, easily influenced by the abler natives, and many of them still hold to their ancient gods and heathen cere monies. This class has always robbed its lowland neighbors, and from it the insurgent Tagalos have drawn their principal assistance, espe cially the bolo contingent, which has in many instances been induced to viciously attack our troops, and has in consequence suffered severely. To reduce this class of people to submission or to entirely check its forays on the coast towns—an occupation acquired from or existing in heredity—must necessarily be a labor of time; but our troops, unlike those which were maintained by Spain, pursue them to their moun tain concealments, and inflict punishments they neither anticipate nor think possible. In the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu over fifty military stations are maintained; consequently the majority of the inhabitants are comparatively secure, and are gradually gaining confi dence, so much so that in many instances they have given us assistance without fearing the vengeance of their adversaries, which would surely visit them were our protection withdrawn. Prior to reporting the operations on the north Mindanao coast of the troops sent there from Manila on March 20, under the command of Major-General Bates, a brief review of our military experience within the district of Mindanao and Jolo should be presented. At the date of our last annual report the only troops stationed within the dis trict were the two battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry, of which six companies were stationed at the port of Jolo, one at Siassi, and one at Bongao on the Taui Taui group of islands. The Moros of the Jolo Archipelago, through their datos, professed friendship which their actions indicated. The Sultan, however, continued to keep some what aloof, pressing his money claim for the maintenance at our expense of the police force at Siassi, which he had established before American occupation. He was distinctly informed by General Bates that the claim could not be favorably considered, and he refused to accept the monthly compensation allowed him for services, a compen sation which Spain had paid and which we concluded to continue.